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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LOWELL V. PARRISH, EMILY L.
PARRISH, his wife, VADAL PETERSON and MELVA PETERSON,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.
8690

vs.
HARLOW G. RICHARDS and MRS.
HARLOW G. RICHARDS,

Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Respondents
STATEMENT
In Utah, as elsewhere :
"The writ of injunction is issued by the courts
as a matter of grace and not because the applicant
has a right to it. (Citations.) The application for
injunctive relief is in the form of a prayer, addressed to the conscience of the chancellor, who
may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, either
grant the prayer or deny it, as the facts and circumstances of the case may seem to require." (Italics
added.) Melrose vs. Low, 80 Utah 356, 15 P. 2d
319, 320.
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"The power to issue injunctions should be exercised with great caution and only where the reason
and necessity therefor are clearly established."
(Italics added.) 43 C. J. S. Injunctions §15.
Equitable principles govern suits to enforce restrictive
covenants. 14 Am. Jur., Covenants §338.
"Whether injunctive relief will be granted to restrain the violation of building restrictions is a matter within the sound legal discretion of the chancellor, to be determined in the light of all the facts and
circumstances. * * *" ld.
The text continues :
"The complainants right to insist on the covenant and to invoke the injunctive power of the court
must be clear and satisfactory."
C. J. S. says:
"However, not every violation of a building restriction will entitle plaintiff to injunctive relief.
The granting or refusal of relief is a matter of discretion with the court and not a matter of absolute
right, and is to be governed by equitable considerations." 43 C. J. S. Injunctions §87. (Italics added.)
Applying these principles, Judge Ellett concluded:
"7. The court concludes that plaintiffs have
failed as a matter of law to establish that defendants' tennis court and fence is a structure within
the prohibition of said Restrictive Covenant or that
plaintiffs have any clear right to any injunction
against the same. On the other hand, the court concludes the same is not such a prohibited structure
and that such right is not clear and that plaintiffs
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are not so entitled. Furthermore, the court concludes
that in the exercise of sound discretion, such injunction should and would be denied herein" (R. 203).
Restrictive Covenants must be construed against limitations and in favor of free use of property.
"Covenants and agreements restricting the free
use of property are strictly construed against limitations upon such use. Such restrictions will not be
aided or extended by implication or enlarged by
construction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the
unrestricted use of property." 14 Am. J ur., Covenants §212.

"* * * all doubts should generally be resolved in favor of the free use of the property and
against restrictions." Thompson on Real Property,
§3569.
Accordingly, Judge Ellett also concluded:
"5. That defendants' tennis court and fence is
not a structure as forbidden and prohibited in and
by the Restrictive Covenant of Northcrest Subdivision set out in the complaint and the Findings of
Fact herein. In construing the Covenant, the court
concludes that as a matter of law, the restriction
therein must be, and the same is hereby construed
against limitations on the free use of defendants'
property and all doubts and ambiguities are hereby
resolved in favor of such free use" (R. 202).
Moreover, the plaintiffs themselves are in violation of
both (1) the Restrictive Covenant, and (2) the fenceheight Ordinance :
-

Plaintiffs Parrish mantain a high, board fence
or "structure" at the North side of their prop-
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erty over the permitted 6-foot height ( 10 feet
by their admission, R. 20) and some 35 feet long
(Finding 10, R. 200) anchored to their house by
high beams. This fence or structure is 1 inch
inside their side line (R. 20) which violates also
the City Sideyard Ordinance against building
closer than 8 feet from a side line1 in this Residential "A" District. (The court took judicial
notice of the City Ordinances. R. 85. City Ordinances, §51-18-4, §51-12-3.) See Photo Exhibits
16, 17, 18. (Sideyard Ordinance, R. 144.)
-

Plaintiffs Peterson2 maintain a high 10 foot wall
and fence along the West end of their property
which violates the permitted 6 foot height of
fences. (Finding 11, R. 200.) See photos, Exhibits 12 and 13.

Furthermore, other high walls and fences over 6 feet
high abound in the area (Finding 12, R. 201). And, swimming pools with flood lights, patios and dressing rooms,
etc., are maintained by at least two owners in the Subdivision. (R. 69, 75, 199. Photo Exhibit 24. View of trial
judge, 81.) 3
As to plaintiffs' own violations, the court concluded:
"2. Plaintiffs Parrish by erecting and maintaining said high board fence and plaintiffs Peterson by erecting and maintaining said high wall and
fence have themselves violated said Zoning Ordin1

This court upheld the 8 foot side-line Ordinance recently (1955) in

Hargraves vs. Young, 3 Utah 2d 175, 280 P. 2d 974.

2 Plaintiff Vadal Peterson testified he has no objection to athletic
games. "I even coach tennis" at the University. He has coached there
32 years (R. 110-11) and plaintiffs admit the court is not a nuisance
per se (R. 185).
3 1n fact, plaintiff, Mrs. Parrisht and her daughter sometimes swim and
sun at one of the pools (R. 180 J.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
ance and, being in violation thereof, are thereby estopped to and may not maintain any action against
defendants in regard to the alleged violation of said
Ordinance respecting the height of defendants' fence
or fences" (R. 201).
And, for their failure to object to other fences and
walls maintained by their neighbors in violation, the court
concluded:
"3. The court concludes also that for failure
to take any action to prevent or remove the high
walls and fences in the surrounding area above
mentioned, plaintiffs are estopped to and may not
maintain any action against defendants in regard
to the alleged violation of said Ordinance in respect
to the height of defendants' fence or fences" (R.
202).
To complicate matters, the West end of defendants'
tennis court (and property)-the West 15.2 feet-is not
in N orthcrest Subdivision at all, but lies beyond that Plat
in another Section altogether (R. 10) and, of course, is
not subject to the Restrictive Covenant (Finding 3. R.
196). What should a trial court do in that circumstance?
Judge Ellett decided thus:
"8. The West 15.2 feet of defendants' tennis
court and fence being wholly outside of N orthcrest
Subdivision is, therefore, not subject to said Restrictive Covenant and the court could not order any injunction in regard to same. To order the remainder
of said court and fence removed would still leave
the same standing on said 15.2 feet portion and
would be of no benefit to plaintiffs and would result
only in punishment to defendants and leave the 15.2
feet of fence standing as an eyesore, and the court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

concludes as a matter of equity and sound discretion that injunction should and would be denied
herein against the portion of said court and fence
lying within said Northcrest Subdivision" (R. 203).
Judgment was against the plaintiffs, no cause of action
(except for prohibiting overhead floodlights on defendants'
tennis court (R. 204), which their answer had already
denied they would ever erect) 4 and plaintiffs appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TENNIS COURT IS NOT A STRUCTURE
FORBIDDEN BY THE COVENANT.
POINT II.
THE FENCE SURROUNDING THE TENNIS
COURT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CITY
FENCE HEIGHT ORDINANCE.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE
FENCE-HEIGHT ORDINANCE MAY NOT SUE
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE COURT
PROPERLY HELD THEY WERE ESTOPPED.
POINT IV.
AS THE TRIAL COURT RULED, IF THE TENNIS COURT IS A STRUCTURE, THE PARRISH
4 Defendants' answer said: "Deny they intend to or will erect or place
on any retaining wall, or at all, any overhead lights" (R. 11).
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HIGH BOARD FENCE IS A STRUCTURE
ALSO.
POINT V.
THE WEST PORTION OF RESPONDENTS'
LOT LIES OUTSIDE OF NORTHCREST SUBDIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
COVENANT.
POINT VI.
ESTOPPEL OF APPELLANTS BY OTHER
HIGH WALLS AND SWIMMING POOLS.
POINT VII.
CUTTING AND FILLING IS INEVITABLE IN
THE STEEP HILLSIDE AREA INVOLVED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TENNIS COURT IS NOT A STRUCTURE
FORBIDDEN BY THE COVENANT.
The N orthcrest Restrictive Covenant mentions, "structure". Plaintiffs' Memorandum below admits (R. 40) the
word "does not have one meaning for all times and all
places". We agree. Its meaning cannot be found in ordinary lexicography. The dictionary cannot give the answer.
Webster does not deal with N orthcrest's private meaning.
So the meaning must be sought in the setting of the
language employed by the Covenant itself. The Covenant,
after declaring the residential character of the lots, their
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use for single family residence purposes, and forbidding
flats and apartment houses says:

"* * * and no structure shall be erected or
placed on any of said lots other than a one, two or
three car garage, and one single family dwelling,
not to exceed one story in height * * *" (R.
196).
We think construing a covenant is like construing a
statute. In construing statutes, wor~s associated together
"take color" from each other. The rule of ejusdem generis
applies. And ejusdem generis applies also in construing
covenants. 14 Am. Jur., Covenants §213.

"Limitation of General Words by Specific
Terms. - General and specific words in a statute
which are associated together, and which are capable of an analogous meaning, take color from each
other, so that the general words are restricted to a
sense analogous to the less general. Under this rule,
general terms in a statute may be regarded as limited by subsequent more specific terms. Similarly,
in accordance with what is commonly known as the
rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general
words follow a designation of particular subjects
or classes of persons, the meaning of the general
words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the pa1·ticular designation
and as including only things or persons of the same
kind, class, character, or nature of those specifically
enumerated. The general words are deemed to have
been used, not to the wide extent which they might
bear if standing alone, but as related to words of
more definite and particular meaning with which
they are associated. In accordance with the rule of
ejusdem generis, such terms as 'other', 'other thing',
'other persons', 'othe·rs', 'otherwise', or 'any other',
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when preceded by a specific enumeration, are commonly given a restricted meaning, and limited to
articles of the same nature as those previously described. The rule of ejusdem generis has been de·clared to be a specific application of the broader
maxim of 'nosciture a sociis', which is discussed in
other sections of this subdivision." 50 Am. Jur.,
Statutes §249.
Northcrest's Covenal).t contains two things: (1) a
general word, and ( 2) specific words. The general "structure"; the specific "one, two or three-car garage, and one
single family dwelling, not to exceed one story in height".
Under the rule, "structure" takes color from "garage and
single family dwelling". They (the words) are associated
together. And, by ejusdem generis, the general word "structure" is restricted and relates to things of the same kind,
class or nature as the specific words "garage and single
family dwelling".
Hence, N orthcrest who imposed the Covenant on all
grantees, must be presumed to have intended that the kind
of "structure" forbidden was something more than a simple enclosure for playing tennis, but rather something like
a garage or one story house, for example, a shed, a store,
a kennel, a horse barn, a mortuary, a private mausoleum, an
extra house, an extra garage, a private museum building,
a private theater building, a heating plant building, a laundry building, etc., etc.
If we turn to the residential character referred to in
the Covenant, this view, we think is strengthened for it is
quite common for owners to have tennis courts at their
residences, even swimming pools, as two of them in North-
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crest Subdivision across the street do. 5 The only tennis
court case we have been able to find (and appellants have
found no others) is Kern vs. Murphy, (Ohio 1936) 40 Ohio
Supp. 365. 23 A. L. R. 2d 949. That covenant forbade
"buildings except necessary out buildings". The tennis
court involved was an "enclosure consisting of steel poles
about nine feet high carrying chicken wire netting, it being
in the nature of a high, open wire fence surrounding the
tennis court". It was held not to be a "building" as contemplated by the covenant. Nor is the tennis court in our
case, we submit, a "structure" within the N orthcrest Covenant involved.
Judge Ellett properly concluded:
"5. That defendants' tennis court and fence
is not a structure as forbidden and prohibited in and
by the Restrictive Covenant of Northcrest Subdivision set out in the complaint and the Findings of Fact
herein. In construing the Covenant, the court concludes that, as a matter of law, the restriction therein
must be, and the same is hereby, construed against
limitations on the free use of defendants' property
and all doubts and ambiguities are hereby resolved
in favor of such free use" (R. 202).
Also:
"7. The court concludes that plaintiffs have
failed as a matter of law to establish that defendants' tennis court and fence is a structure within
the prohibition of said Restrictive Covenant or that
plaintiffs have any clear right to any injunction
against the same. On the other hand, the court concludes the same is not such a prohibited structure
5Pretrial ( R. 69, 74-75). Photo Exhibit 24.
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and that such right is not clear and that plaintiffs
are not so entitled. Furthermore, the court concludes
that in the exercise of sound discretion, such injunction should and would be denied herein" (R. 203).
POINT II.
THE FENCE SURROUNDING THE TENNIS
COURT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CITY
FENCE HEIGHT ORDINANCE.
The trial court heard the evidence. He even took a
"view" of the three properties-Parrish, Richards and
Peterson-and the surrounding area (R. 81, 137). A mass
of testimony was involved about how the properties (each
fronting Eastward on I Street) sloped· steeply from North
to South along their width 15% in grade (R. 88, 158). So,
every owner along the hill had to cut and fill to average
or "equalize" his North and South property lines. (R. 139) ;
thus, each property owner "terraced" his yard in two levels,
as plaintiff Peterson did ( R. 122) .6 Parrish did likewise
(R. 94, 96). That is the usual problem on steeply sloping
properties (R. 139). Dr. Richards built a retaining wall
along the South of his property to hold the terracing and
keep the earth from sloughing down hill, while Parrish
and Peterson "battered their earth back". In fact, Parrish
raised his lower (South) terrace 3 feet and Peterson did
a comparable thing (R. 142). "We built a wall. They
battered the earth. That is the only difference" (R. 142).
Judge Ellett found that the parties each "terraced" their
6 In fact, the Peterson retaining wall was found to be over on Respondent Richards' property at the East end (front) but Dr. Richards
told Peterson "it was all right to leave it the way it was" (R. 124).
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respective properties into two levels or terraces, that cutting and filling was necessary to level off each terrace
and make the same useful and suitable and that retaining
walls were built "in order to hold the earth in place and
prevent its washing and sloughing away" (R. 198).
A rough result of the required terracing of these properties might be indicated by the accompanying sketch.
( LooJd.na Veatward)

Reta1n1ng

Vall

Battered
Barth

Note: Excellent views of the steep slope of the land and the "terracing" required in this hillside area are shown by the photographs
in the record:
( 1) Parrish' property (upper left) Exhibits D-3 and 11;
(upper right) Exhibits 16, 17 and 19 (earth battered
back). (R. 67, 117-18, 146, 147.)
(2) Peterson's rear (West) fence. Exhibits 12, 13. (R. 11820.)
(3) E. B. Kuhe property, 629 Aloha Road. Exhibit 22. (R.
168.)
( 4) Von Holbrook property, 652 Aloha Road. Exhibit 23. (R.
170.)
(5) Clifford 0. Gledhill property, 625 Northcrest Drive. Exhibit 24. (R. 71, 172.) Note the terracing and "earth
battered back" of this property around the swimming
pool.

The burden was on plaintiffs to prove the Richards'
tennis court fence actually violated the Ordinance. That it
was over 6 feet high. Six feet from where? The sidewalk
level cannot govern. That walk is at least 2 and even as
much as 4 feet belo~o the original land level in places. Plain.;.
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tiff Parrish, an architect, said so (R. 92, 93). And what
constitutes the "fence", the metal posts and wire or the
latter and the base or wall on which they rest? Remember,
in injunction cases, plaintiffs (1) have the burden of proof
as in other actions, and (2) their right must be clear clearly established. 7
Appellants claim some evidence about the Richards
retaining wall on which the fence rests, being at one point
some 36 inches higher than the "natural grade" (whatever
that is). Appellants' Brief, 10. But, plaintiff P·eterson
explained the "low point" on the terrain (which must have
created the corresponding high point on the retaining wall
between his property and Richards') resulted from floods
which had coursed across the Richards lot before the homes
were built (R. 101-02) following a "natural, low ravine
that had been there" (R. 115).
The Ordinance talks about "average grade", saying
fences must not exceed 6 feet above the "average grade of
adjoining properties". Section 51-4-4. Where is that?
Appellants have not shov1n that. Nor, clearly so, as they
must. Average grade is not defined. Do we measure 6 feet
on the ground as now exposed (or at an assumed level) at
the corner posts and then shear off everything above a
straight line extending between the two? Or, do we do that
between sections or posts or levels, cutting one down, leaving the next up, another down, another up, etc., etc.? The
clarity of that is ··something to dwell upon. After viewing
the properties and the surrounding area and hearing all
Page 2 herein. 43 C. J. S., Injunctions §15. 14 Am. Jur., Covenants §338.
7
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of the confusing evidence, and considering the Ordinance,
Judge Ellett finally concluded, as he only could, from that
mass of confusion and uncertainty, that the fence surrounding the tennis court "does not violate the Zoning Ordinance"
(R. 201) . That conclusion was inescapable upon this
record.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS BEING IN VIOLATION OF THE
FENCE-HEIGHT ORDINANCE MAY NOT SUE
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. THE COURT
PROPERLY HELD THEY WERE ESTOPPED.
"Where the one requesting the injunction has
himself violated the restriction upon his own property, he will be held estopped by his own violation,
and the remedy will be refused." 57 A. L. R. 340.
That thread runs all through the decisions. One violator may not sue another violator. That is only common
sense. So, if the Richards fence actually reaches above the
6 foot Zoning Ordinance in spots (and we deny it does),
plaintiffs are barred. Why? Because Parrish's high board
fence (on the North-Photo Exhibits 16, 17 and 18) and
Peterson's high wall and fence (along the West-Photo
Exhibits 12 and 13) both violate the fence-height Ordinance.
(And, Parrish's also violates the 8 foot side-line Ordinance,
besides. See Page 4 herein.)
Thus, the A. L. R. quote above has reference to co-violators of restrictive covenants; but there can be no difference in reason or in law between co-violators of a covenant
and co-violators of a city o1·dinance. They simply may not
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sue each other for the same violation. On this subject
Tiffany, Law of Real Property, §873 says:
"One cannot obtain relief in equity against the
violation of a restrictive agreement * * * if he
himself is guilty of a substantial breach of the same
restriction."
And look at the following court decisions:

Kneip vs. Schroeder (Ill.) 99 N. E. 617. (1912) :
Building line case. Injunction denied. The head
note reads: "Owners of lots who have encroached
upon a building line along a street are not entitled
to complain of an encroachment to be constructed
by another owner."
Balcom vs. Normile (Mass.) 150 N. E. 885.
(1926) : Injunction denied against a six-car garage
where plaintiff maintains a two-car garage. "the
plaintiff is not in a position to claim * * * that
his neighbor should be enjoined from using her
premises for a garage * * * plaintiff is violating such restriction as much as his neighbor and is
not * * * in a position where he can equitably
claim that she should be enjoined * * * it is
settled that because of her own acts she cannot invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the
defendant from erecting and maintaining the garages."
Smith vs. Spencer, (N. J. 1913) 87 A. 158. Suit
to enjoin 2 foot 2 inch building projection beyond
the set-back line. Injunction was denied "* * *
for the reason that they (plaintiffs) are guilty of
the same kind of violation of the covenant * * *
It is well settled that one who violates a mutual
covenant cannot complain to a court of equity of a
similar violation by his neighbor."
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Moore vs. Adams (Ark. 1940) 140 S. W. 2d 49.
Trailer Camp Case. Injunction denied because: "the
parties here complaining of its violation have themselves violated the general plan in the respects herein
stated, and they are in no position to complain."
Wischmeyer vs. Finch (Ind.) 107 N. E. 2d 661.
Trailer Camp Case. Injunction denied because: "injunctive relief will be denied where complainant has
substantially violated the restrictions * * *"
The court also said, "the granting or refusing of
relief in the violation of a building restriction is a
matter within the discretion of the trial court and
is to be governed by equitable principles." (Italics
added.)
McGovern vs. Brown (Ill. 1925) 147 N. E. 664.
Suit to enjoin violation of 30 foot set-back building
line by six porches of an apartment house extending
10 to 12 feet over the line. Several of the plaintiffs
had violated the building line themselves. Injunction
denied. "* * * three of the plaintiffs have
themselves violated it in constructing their buildings.
Under the previous decisions of this court, complainants cannot and will not be allowed to enforce the
restrictions against defendants."
Curtis vs. Rubin (Ill. 1910) 91 N. E. 84. Building line encroachment case. Injunction denied. "In
this case the complainants, who had themselves disregarded the building line, were asking a court of
equity to enforce the restriction * * * we do
not think that the complainants who had disregarded
the restriction * * * could be heard to object
that defendants were violating the condition to a
greater extent than they were."
Appellants' Brief (P. 14) asserts the Richards fence
depreciates Appellants' property but that the Parrish-Peter-
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son high fences (each admittedly well over 6 feet) actually
"enhance" values of the surrounding properties. The assertion is amazing and how it could result is not explained.
Appellants wonder also if the Parrish fence should estop the
Petersons. But, Parrish and Peterson, having made common cause together in the complaint against Respondents,
we submit that each must suffer the consequences of his
co-plaintiff's violations. Having joined as plaintiffs, their
cause of action "if not good as. to one plaintiff, is bad as
to all of them". 71 C. J. S., Pleading §72. 8
Peterson claims his violative fence is only "temporary".
Appellants' Brief (P. 13). He so claimed below (R. 119).
But, the Ordinance allows no exception for temporary fencing. It is addressed to all fences. Moreover, Judge Ellett
"viewed" this fence himself. From the evidence and the
view, he rejected the contention. The photographs in evidence support his rejection and show the permanent character of the Peterson fence. (Exhibits 12 and 13.) It has
been standing since the summer of 1954 (R. 128).
POINT IV.
AS THE TRIAL COURT RULED, IF THE TENNIS COURT IS A STRUCTURE, THE PARRISH
HIGH BOARD FENCE IS A STRUCTURE
ALSO.
This proposition is clear enough to the court, we think.
The trial court took a "view" October 4, 1956 (R. 81, 137)
8

That proposition is akin to the rule that a joint exception to a jury
instruction must be good as to all who join or it will be bad as to
each. 88 C. J. S., Trial §420; and that joint assignments of error, if
not good as to one, are bad as to all. 4 C. J. S., Appeal & Error
§1248. McGuire vs. State Bank, 49 Utah 381. 164 P. 494.
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and saw this high board fence. It is over 10 feet high. And it
is braced with two large, heavy beams across the top anchored to the Parrish roof. It is fully shown in the photographs in evidence. (Exhibits 16, 17 and 18.) Clearly, if
the tennis court is a structure, this high board fence is also
a structure. And, in that event, plaintiffs having violated
the Covenant themselves by maintaining their own structure, are barred from enforcing the Covenant. One violator
may not sue another violator to enjoin a similar violation
of a covenant. (Please turn to Page 14 herein.)
The trial judge ruled :
"6. That if defendants' tennis court and fence
be construed to be a structure within the prohibition
of said Restrictive Covenant, plaintiffs Parrish' high
board fence and beams anchored to the Parrish
house must likewise be construed as a structure; and
plaintiffs, by so maintaining said high board fence,
are thus estopped to and may not maintain any
action against defendants in regard to the alleged
violation of the Covenant respecting a structure"
(R. 202).
POINT V.

THE WEST PORTION OF RESPONDENTS'
LOT LIES OUTSIDE OF NORTHCREST SUBDIVISION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE
COVENANT.
As the answer shows (R. 10) and as Appellants admitted in response to Respondents' interrogatories (No. 3,
R. 21), the West 15.2 feet of the Richards property lies
wholly outside of N orthcrest. The trial court so found, as
he was bound to do (R. 196). Of course, then, that outside
portion (and the tennis court thereon) is not subject to
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the Restrictive Covenant, as Judge Ellett concluded (R.
203) . To order the balance of the court removed (the part
within N orthcrest) would be to leave the West 15.2 feet
of the tennis court in place. That would result in a dangling
eyesore. That injunction would simply serve as punishment
and reprisal to Dr. Richards and his wife. Furthermore, it
would also be harmful and damaging to plaintiffs, particularly Peterson, whose residence would then abut the useless
remains. The trial court so concluded (R. 203) .
But, since sound discretion is the touchstone, it must
be clear, we think, that injunctions do not lie simply to
vindicate one litigant as againt another, nor to punish or
oppress.
"Since an injunction should not be made an
instrument of oppression and injury, it will not be
granted when good conscience does not require it,
where it will operate oppressively or contrary to
justice, where it is not reasonable and equitable
under the circumstances. * * *" 43 C. J. S., Injunctions §12.
We submit that it would have been most unreasonable
and inequitable to order Dr. Richards to remove that part
of the tennis court within the plat when the West 15.2 feet
beyond would be left. Sound discretion, we think, could
not possibly arrive at such result. The trial court properly
so ruled.
POINT VI.
ESTOPPEL OF APPELLANTS BY OTHER
HIGH WALLS AND SWIMMING POOLS.
It was shown on the trial and the court found (R. 201)
that the N orthcrest Subdivision area abounds with high
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fences and walls. Photographs are in evidence showing
some of these. (Exhibits 22, 23. R. 167, 168, 170.) Dr.
Richards testified to at least three high walls or fences
which are well over 6 feet-in fact, far above his reach, as
shown by the photographs: (1) Kuhe's high retaining
wall, 629 Aloha Road (Exhibit 22), across the street North
from the Freed residence and swimming pool which the
trial court saw, (2) Holbrook's high wall and fence, 652
Aloha Road (Exhibit 23), next to the Freed residence, and
(3) Montague's high wall next door South of Petersons'
property. Failure to take action against these fences and
walls, the trial court held, estopped Appellants from challenging Respondents' fences (R. 202).
Then, there are the swimming pools : ( 1) the Freed
pool, shower and dressing rooms (where Mrs. Parrish and
her daughter sometimes swim and sun (R. 180), and, (2)
the Gledhill's pool and bath houses just East of Petersons
(Photo Exhibit 24). The evidence (undisputed) was that
both pools necessitated dismantling of the West section of
each owner's fence in construction; that trucks, workmen
and machinery came and went and operated for months
right under Appellants' noses, so to speak, in constructing
the two pools and that none of Appellants objected (R.
173-76) . They thereby accepted, impliedly at least, the
pools and dressing rooms as not being structures banned
by the Covenant. The tennis court, we submit, is even less
such a structure, being far less fixed and permanent than
the swimming pools.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
POINT VII.
CUTTING AND FILLING IS INEVITABLE IN
THE STEEP HILLSIDE AREA INVOLVED.
The area involved is a steep hillside one. Steep slopes
require cutting, filling, retaining walls, etc. That is just
common sense. It is common knowledge. The California
court recognizes this. It said in Beck vs. Bell Air Properties (Cal.) 286 P. 2d 503, 509 :

"* * * it is a matter of common knowledge
that retaining walls, hillside terracing, planting and
similar methods have been extensively and successfully used to hold fills in place. This is particularly
true in the territory surrounding Los Angeles; and
is evidenced by the extensive building operations
made possible by hillside fills in the Baldwin Hills,
the Hollywood Hills and the Santa Monica Mountains.
"Moreover, the creation, construction and maintenance of hillside fills is a matter of common usage.
Cutting, leveling and filling are the inevitable, constant and ordinary methods pursued in the development of hillside areas."
Plaintiffs conceded that cutting and filling is necessary.9
CONCLUSION
We have seen that injunction is by grace, alone, issuable only in the sound discretion of the court. What court?

"The court which is to exercise the discretion
is the trial court and not the appellate court." 43
C. J. S., Injunctions § 14.
"* * * plaintiffs concede that property owners whose property
is located on hilly terrain must, to a certain extent, cut and fill, and
that the original grade should not necessarily govern. * * *"
(Plaintiffs' Pretrial Memorandum. R. 30.)
9
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And,
"Generally, in the absence of manifest abuse of
discretion, an appellate court will not review, modify
or revise discretionary rulings as to the grant, dissolution, continuance or modification of an injunction or restraining order." 5 C. J. S., Appeal &
Error §1591.
Throughout the trial court's conclusions, it is stated
that the injunction was denied "in the exercise of a sound
discretion" (R. 202, 203). That sound discretion was exercised and arrived at after a full hearing of all the facts
regarding these properties and a "view" thereof by the
Judge.
Error is never presumed. On the contrary, all reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the judgment
below and against error-

"* * * and the burden of affirmatively
showing error is on the party complaining thereof."
5 C. J. S., Appeal & Error §1533.
Appellants have failed to show error in and by the
trial court. They have failed to show the exercise of its
discretion was abused. Consequently, the judgment refusing the injunction must stand.
And:
"One seeking to enforce a restriction has the
burden of demonstrating that his version of it should
be sustained or is sustained by the plain and natural
interpretation of its language, or that the activity
objected to is within the terms of the restriction."
26 C. J. S., Deeds §163.
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Appellants have failed to demonstrate that their version of the tennis court (that it is a structure prohibited by
the Restriction) is sustained by the restrictive language.
Restrictive covenants are to be construed against limitations and in favor of free use of the property, as the trial
court decided.
Respondents submit:
1. The tennis court is not a structure forbidden by
the Covenant. The term structure therein must
be given color by the words "one, two or three
car garage and one single family dwelling".
The rule ejusdem generis applies.
2. The fence surrounding the tennis court does
not violate the City fence-height Ordinance.
Appellants failed to prove that it does.
3. Being in violation themselves of the fenceheight Ordinance, Appellants were estopped,
as the trial court held, to sue for injunctive
relief. Their fences violated the Ordinance. One
violator may not sue another violator.
4. If the tennis court were ruled to be a structure,
the Parrish high, board fence is a structure
also. Again, one violator may not sue another
violator to enjoin a similar violation of a restrictive covenant.
5. The West portion ( 15.2 feet) of Respondents'
property lies wholly outside of Northcrest. It
is not subject to the Restrictive Covenant. The
trial court's refusal-discretionary refusal-in
that circumstance to enjoin the tennis court was
correct.
6. Appellants were estopped by their failure to
oppose or object to the numerous high walls and
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the swimming pools in the surrounding Northcrest area.
7. Cutting, filling, terracing and retaining walls
are inevitable in the steep hillside area involved.
The trial court heard the evidence. It also "viewed"
the premises and area involved. In the exercise of "sound
discretion", it refused the injunction and dismissed. Abuse
of discretion has not been shown. Appellants have not established any error. The judgment below was correct and
must be affirmed, with costs to Respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS & ARMSTRONG,
EDWARD M. GARRETT,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
511 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
September, 1957.
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